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MOTHERS AND SONS OF GODS.
by moncure d. conway,
[continued.]
II.
The difference between the account of the creation
of man in the first chapter of Genesis and that in the
second was recognised by the ancient Jews and gave
rise to various theories. The most important was that
of Philo, who explained it by his doctrine of the Logos,
or "Second God," through whom the Supreme Father
created all things, and in whose image the man of
Genesis i was ideally formed. Philo maintained that
mortal nature could be fashioned in the image of the
Supreme Father. Adam, formed in Genesis ii, he de-
scribes as "the visible man, in his likeness to the con-
ceptual model"; that is, to the Logos man of Genesis
i,
—
" the incorporeal and spiritual man, in the likeness
of the archetype, and as representing a higher char-
acter, the divine Logos, the first principle, the proto-
type, the original measure of all nature." The less
learned and unphilosophical Jews, however, simply
concluded that Adam had a first wife—the "female"
of Genesis i—Eve being his second wife. This first
wife became associated with a mysterious being, whose
name, Lilith, first appears in an ancient Babylonian
record, and is found in Isaiah xxxiv, 14, rendered
"screech-owl" in the old version and " night-monster"
in the revised version. I have explored the many
curious legends of the enchanting Lilith in my " De-
monology and Devil- Lore," but may here say that,
according to Jewish tradition, her creation at the same
time with the man (Gen. i), and without indication of
inferiority, led to a quarrel between the two as to head-
ship, which resulted in Lilith's leaving Paradise and
wedding Sammael (Satan). Eve was then created for
Adam, and it was probably to assert her inferiority
that the "side" of Adam was interpreted as his rib.
This folk-lore could not be unfamiliar in the Ghetto at
Rome, and, consequently, among the Christians. It
has long been understood that the Jewish notion that
it was Lilith who assumed the form of the serpent in
Eden, is represented in Michel Angelo's painting in
the Vatican ; where the serpent has the breast and
head of a woman, and there is little reason to doubt
that the woman present at the man's creation, alluded
to in my previous paper, is meant for Lilith.
Eden is of Oriental origin. The wondrous garden
of the Hindu deity Indra,—like Yahve, a rain-god,— is
called in Sanscrit hJwin ; and there is good reason to
believe that this word is related to the Persian HcJcn—
the birthplace of Zoroaster. Our word " Paradise" is
from the Persian (Zend) /(7/r/,/('3(7. The story of the
Fall of Man, in Genesis, closely resembles that of the
first man and woman, Meshia and Meshiane, in the
Persian legend. There was in this ( Persian) garden a
sacred tree, Horn (related to the vine soma, of Hindu
mythology), which was reserved by the gods, who
from it derived immortalitj'. Meshia and Meshiane
were persuaded to eat of this S3.cred JIam, "tree of
life," by Aeshma-deva (now Asmodeus), described in
the Zend-Avesta as "the two-footed serpent of lies."
( In John viii, 44, it is said the devil " is a liar and so is
his father.")
In the Sistine Chapel the eye wanders from the
panels of Lilith and Eve and Adam to the great paint-
ing of the Last Judgment. There is seen " the second
Adam," as the " Lord from Heaven," consigning the
wicked to hell. His face is full of wrath. Beside him
is his mother, her face full of compassion, her hands
crossed beneath his uplifted, menacing arm : she seems
trying to restrain him. There is but one woman in all
that heavenly hierarchy. The loss of that woman from
Protestant altars may partly account for its hard dog-
mas and cruel history.
A lady told me that she once tried to console a poor
Scotch woman who .had lost her little boy, but the sob-
bing mother said : " What troubles me is that they be
all men-folk up there (in Heaven) and won't know how
to do for him." Protestants ridiculed the late Pope a
good deal for his promulgation of the Virgin's immacu-
late conception, but they themselves have been steadily
recalling the Madonna into their rehgion, and she may
be seen reappearing in the Protestant pictures of Jesus,
with feminine face, his hair parted in the middle and
flowing down in soft locks ; also in the renewed asser-
tion of the tenderness and compassionateness of Christ,
represented to the Catholic world in the Madonna.
Were Michel Angelo to reappear as an English or
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American artist and paint the severe and angry Christ
of his Last Judgment, his picture would not be tole-
rated by cultured Christians.
Madonna Mary, as a mother of God, is really de-
scended from Eve, as the mother of Cain (Yahve's
son), from whom is traced the genealogy of Joseph,
Mary's husband. Of course, in the first century noth-
ing had been heard of the miraculous conception of
Jesus. Paul declares Jesus to be the seed of David,
and as Joseph alone— not Mary—was descended from
David, the story of the conception by the Holy Ghost
was evidently unknown to him. It was indeed essen-
tial that the Messiah should be legitimately descended
from David, and So the New Testament genealogies
have made it out. But the idea of Jesus as Messiah
passed away before the idea of the Divine Man, which
was essential to the inclusion of the Gentiles, who
knew not any "Messiah." It was also essential to
the moralisation of the new faith. The Messianic idea
was an expression of Jewish aristocracy. It had noth-
ing to do with morals. If the genealogy from Yahve
to Joseph be examined, it will be seen that the con
tinuation of the divine family in the earth is by no
means associated with the preservation of virtue.
Murderous Cain and Lamech, drunken Noah, menda-
cious Abraham, tricky Jacob, treacherous David, are
eminent fruits on the family- tree of Yahve. Indeed,
the aim and purport of this colony of demigods on
earth would appear to be the propagation of Yahve's
dominion in the world by the clan of his devotees.
Notwithstanding our demonstrations of the incred-
ible character of the miraculous birth-legend of Jesus,
it may be seen in another light. It represents, I be-
lieve, a much higher idea than the genealogical Jesus,
from which itrelieved the whole conception of religion.
It superseded a tribal Messiah with a human-hearted,
woman-born being, in whose divinity a paternal deity
was represented, a Father of the whole human race.
This larger and moral idea of the deity is indeed visi-
ble in some poetic passages of the Old Testament,
especially in the deity who spares Nineveh, but it has
not prevailed against the hard theological system, the
rigid assertion of supremacy of the "chosen people."
The legend of Adam and Eve and the serpent is
not alluded to in the Old Testament after its narration
in Genesis, because it was imported by the Jews at a
late period, and how much else they imported it is
difficult to say; but they would appear to have pro-
jected into the legend of man's creation their Abra-
hamic and Noachian theology, according to which
their tribe was both by covenant and miraculous gen
eration the family of God. For the miraculous con-
ception of Isaac by Sarah reappears in that of the first
child, Cain, and in the first-born of God, by Mary.
Whether this larger idea, surrendering tribal suprem-
acy, was evolved from Persian importations, is a ques-
tion involving extended exploration of Persian scrip-
ture and analyses of Christian and Jewish apocryphal
books,—such as "The Wisdom of God" and "The
Book of Enoch,"—the Writings of Philo and the Enos-
tic Books. This is not necessary for my present pur-
pose. There is danger in pressing too far striking
analogies between religious and phonetic resemblances
of names, words, and legends. As fingers resemble
fingers all over the world, so some similarities must be
expected in religions and mythologies, though of in-
dependent development. So far as we have gone,
however, there is little difficulty in distinguishing Per-
sian elements in the Judaic-Christian system. When
we enter the Zoroastrian temple we find in their nat-
ural place and relation, figures which in the Old Testa-
ment are mixed, as if in a curiosity shop. Adam and
Eve are introduced, and the Fall reported, only to be
referred to no more, and Satan figures only in Job, a
book adapted from other lands. And, what is of great
significance, important figures, which, in the Jewish
mythology, are personalities, with individual interests
and characters, like men and women, are in the Per-
sian system known only by their functions. In Judaic
mythology the Fall of Man does not affect the human
race at all ; but in Persia it is fundamental, and was
so ages before it was adopted as the foundation of
Christianity.
In a concluding paper I propose to give some ac-
count of the Persian Madonna, whose development




The difference between the two great philosophical
parties of the middle ages may, in a modernised form,
be characterised as follows :
The Realist recognises forms as realities of a uni-
versal nature. The samenesses in the world, the simi-
larities and dissimilarities, the relations and the changes
taking place in these relations are actual and objective.
Thus the universal is real.
The Nominalist regards universals as idealities.
He professes to know only single experiences and be-
lieves that he is not warranted in assuming a coherence
among them. To him the samenesses which a mind
discovers are not real ; they are mental impositions.
The regularities of laws have no objective existence,
but are purely subjective conceptions, and universals
are mere names.
To the Realist the universe is one whole, the bond
of union being the universal in the single experiences.
To the Nominalist the universe is a sum of innume-
rable items, and we are not entitled to make any con-
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elusion from the nature of one of them as to the nature
of others.
The nominalistic position appears to be the more
guarded one. But when adhered to and appHed with
consistency it makes knowledge itself impossible. It
is in its root scepticism and leads to agnosticism.
Now the question is, can the realistic assumption
be proved or not? Is the denial of the legitimacy of
realistic conclusions justifiable or not ?
If the universe were actuall}' an indifferent medley
of single facts, without any coherence of their own, so
that all the order we see in the world has been given
to it by ourselves, reality would be more correctly
pictured in the animal brain than -in the human mind.
The question, as to whether or not there is any
universality is the problem of reason. If there were
no universality there would be no reliability in reason.
Reason would be of a purel}' ideal, of a merely sub-
jective and illusory nature. Its application to reality
would be an assumption, at best a mere working hy-
pothes's. Thus there would be no knowledge, but
opinions only, and we could, with strict consistency,
not even say that if all men are mortal, Caius, being a
man, must be mortal, too.
When we deny universality, we kill reason, for uni-
versality is the life-blood of reason.
How can we justify the assumption of universalit}' ?
There may be some coherence among the many
single facts of our experience, but we are perhaps un-
able to verify it, and the coherence may be partial for
all we know.
Before we enter into a discussion of the problem,
let us ask : Is it at all true that experience consists of
many single items, and do we not, when treating ex-
perience as such, inadvertently imply a whole theor}-,
the consequence of which will crop out unawares after-
wards? It maybe true that realism begins with an as-
sumption, but we should not be blind to the fact that
nominalism also is not free of assumptions.
The truth is that experience is a coherent entirety,
and the existence of single facts is due only to an
analysis of experience. There is no fact unconnected
with other facts, and the connections of facts are not
merely incidental features. Reality can be understood
only when it is conceived as a system of changes.
Events are intelligible only when viewed as transforma
tions, so that the laws of form which obtain in these
transformations are universal.
Thus it appears that universality is a fact of ex-
perience as much as a sensation. Sensation is the
subjective symbol for what objectively appears as
matter, and the connections and forms of our sensa-
tions are the subjective aspect of the interrelations of
material reality. The truth is, that not only matter is
real, but its forms, also.
The problem of universality is the same as the
problem of necessity', and the problem of necessity is
the problem of determinableness. * How is it that we
can determine certain things? This again is the prob-
lem of reason.
The most perplexing feature of reason is its faculty
of (7 /r/()/7 determination. We can make certain state-
ments with perfect assurance concerning things which
sometimes we cannot even know by direct experience.
For instance, we accurately measure first the dis-
tance between two observatories, which happen to
lie in the same longitude, and then the two angles
at which the moon passes through the meridian. We
thus have a triangle of which one side and the two
adjacent angles are known, and it is easy enough to
calculate from these data the distance of the moon
from the earth. We can never directly measure the
moon's distance by yard-sticks or tape-lines, but we
can, without further experience or experiment, be sure
that our calculation is correct. The moon's distance
being known, we can proceed to measure the sun's
distance by simply measuring the angle at which sun
and moon appear on earth when the moon is exactly at
the half. We again have a triangle in which three parts
are known, viz., (i) the distance between earth and
mooii
; (2) the angle at the moon as a right angle ;
and (3) the angle at the earth by measurement. And
from these data we can calculate the hypothenuse of
the rightangled triangle, which is the distance between
sun and earth. In this way human reason bridges over
the gap between the known and the unknown.
Reality possesses certain features which can be de-
termined, not by experience, but a priori, by purely
formal thought, i. e., by pure reason.
There is this peculiarity about our reasoning, that
the first act determines the following acts. When we
construct an equilateral triangle, we cannot help also
making the angles equal ; and when we construct an
equiangular triangle, we cannot help making the sides
equal. This is a puzzling fact to those who look upon
the world as a sum of many incoherent items. It is all
but inexplicable from the nominalistic standpoint. But
it is only a more complex case of the fact, that when
we have determined A to be A, we cannot at the same
time determine it to be not A. By positing A, A is A
and remains A in all its conseqtifnccs. Only by inverting
reason itself, can I say that A is A and not A at the
same time.
What is reason?
We present as a preliminary definition the state-
ment that reason is man's method of thinking. Noire
» Necessity is often regarded as a compulsion, and determinism is accord-
ingly confounded with fatalism. "An event is necessary," means simply that
it can be determined, and "to determine" means to describe with precision.
All determinations are made on the supposition of the presence of certain
conditions and the absence of any other factors which might interfere.
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says: "Man thinks because he speaks"; and Max
Miiller, standing upon the same ground, adds: "No
language without reason, no reason without language."
We are quite willing to adopt the results of modern
philology, but they are not sufficient for our pres-
ent purpose. Our problem is deeper still. We accept
the Noir6-Max Miiller theory and may restate it as
follows : Language is the organ of rational thought,
and rational thought develops through the mechanism
of language. Our present problem, however, is not
How did human reason develop ? but How is it possi-
ble that our reason can give us information about real-
ity ?
Not all processes of reasoning give us information
about reality, but only such as are carried on with con-
sistency. Thus we have to modify our preliminary
definition of reason. Reason is not any process of rea-
soning, but a certain and quite definite kind of reason-
ing, and reasoning is rational only when it agrees with
this one kind of reasoning. Accordingly we define rea-
son as "the norm of reasoning."
We ask, Is there any norm of reasoning? In this
form the question again reminds us of the old problem,
realism versus nominalism. Is there any universalitj',
generality, or necessity? Our answer is affirmative
One thing is pre-eminently characteristic of reason,
viz. that there is but one reason. There are not vari-
ous reasons. Reason (if it is reason at all) is the same
in one man as in another man. As there is but one
kind of arithmetic, so there is but one kind of reason.
Reason in the sense of "norm of reasoning " is to
be used without the article. If a man gives a reason
for his action, or if he speaks of the reason he has, he
means the rational motives or principles by which he
allows himself to be influenced. Such reasons are va-
rious and of different natures ; but reason as the norm
of reasoning, is no individual or particular thing or
idea ; its very nature is generality or rather universal-
ity. And it is a real feature of existence.
Mathematicians with great ingenuity have invented
various kinds of mathematics. They have shown that
Euclidean geometry is but one actual case among many
possible instances. Space might be curved, it might
be more than three-dimensional. But no one has yet
been bold enough to propound a theory of curved reason.
And why should there not as well exist a curved
logic as a mathematics of curved space? A curved
logic would be a very original innovation for which
no patent has yet been applied for. What a splendid
opportunity to acquire Riemann's fame in the domain
of logic !
We must let this fine opportunity of propounding
a new and extremely original conception of reason slip
away, for we are not in a disposition to make good use
of it. A curved reason would be simply crooked rea-
son, for the rigid sameness of reason prevents us ad-
mitting any various kinds of reason.
The inmost nature of reason is consistency, and
thus the simplest statement of rational thought is the
maxim of sameness formulated in logic in the sentence
A = A. The formula A = A is, as it were, the straight
line of logic; but with this difference that we can
imagine as possible (although not as actual) the straight
lines of curved spaces, but not a logic that abandons
what might be called "the axiom of consistency."
The axiom of parallels in geometry corresponds to
the syllogism in logic. Inconsistent reason, a reason
which does not acknowledge the truth expressed in the
formula A^A, which can accept the existence and non-
existence of a thing at the same time is pseudo-reason
;
and if pseudo- reason as a possible case by the side of
actual reason were a legitimate assumption, all think-
ing would cease and all being would be thrown into
confusion, reason would be nonsense and the world a
chaos, everything would be a medley without coherence,
without rhyme or reason, a vast bedlam, and reason
itself would present an exceptional case, unaccount-
able, odd, strange, exceptional, brought about perhaps
incidentally as a happy chance. But how this reason
could be of any objective use would present new diffi-
culties. For reason being only an incidental chance
occurrence in our brain would have no applicability to
the objects around us. Of a triangle which we con-
struct in our mind, we can, perhaps, from three known
parts, determine the other unknown parts. But it would
be impossible that this mental model of a triangle
should give us information about a real triangle formed
by the sun, the moon, and the earth. And when in-
formation thus acquired was found to be correct, we
should be confronted with an all but miraculous coinci-
dence.
There are two classes of formal sciences, the one is
characterised by geometry, the other by logic, algebra,
and arithmetic. The former we have on another occa-
sion called purely formal, the other rigidly formal, the
rigidly formal being a special kind of the purely formal.
The rigidly formal sciences are products of our mental
operations. There is no assumption, no hypothesis,
no knowledge of the actual forms of the world in it.
The other formal sciences, such as Euclidean geom-
etry, assumes that space is of a certain nature. Space
is a pure form of the world ; but that space is such as
it is, we know through experience. We cannot by
pure reason alone prove that space is tri-dimensional
or that it is homaloidal.
Reason is not' merely purely formal, it is rigidly
formal. Reason is unequivocally determined ; and
when we say " all men are mortal and Caius is a man,"
we can by no means escape the conclusion that Caius
is mortal.
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The rigidly formal being in its applications strictly
reliable in experience, there is no other explanation
than thinking of experience as being possessed of the
same nature as our thought. There is an analogy be-
tween mental operations and natural processes whicli
proves that they are ultimatel}' of the same kind.
When we consider the events of the world in their
simplest possible conditions, we resolve it into in-
numerable processes of motion, as a constant shifting
about. There are separations and combinations, and
wherever the same separations and combinations take
place there are also the same results. This sameness,
which can be formulated as a law, viz., that the same
produces the same is a reality, and indeed the most
real reality, for it lies at the bottom oi the cosmic na-
ture of the world ; it implies that existence is not a
chaotic chance medley, but a cosmos permeated by
uniformities and regulated by laws. AH laws will in
the end have to be recognised as mere corollaries to
this simplest of all laws, which is nothing but the self-
consistency of being. This fundamental law is by its
very nature eternal and universal ; it thus constitutes
an intrinsic and inalienable quality of existence; and
no existence can be without it. To be sure, it is a
purely formal law, for it tells us nothing as to the sub-
stance, the material, the sensations, or other qualities
of being, but for that reason it is not less real. The
formal, indeed, is the most important part of reality,
for the forms of things make the things in their indi-
viduality what they are.
The same operations which are active everywhere,
separations and combinations, build up the human
frame, and in the human frame also man's mind.
Human reason is a structure built up by mind opera-
tions ; and pure reason is a mental construction of
them in abstract purity. The human mind being a
part of the world, we find that the law of sameness
holds good also for the products of purely mental ope-
rations : the same operations yield the same results.
Moreover, there will be an agreement between the con-
structions of pure reason and the laws that obtain in
them with the configurations of reality and the purely
formal laws of the universe. This agreement was the
puzzle of Kant, which led him astray into the by-
paths of his transcendental idealism ; and yet this
agreement is nothing but the law of sameness, which
he neither doubted as a logical law, nor as a feature of
reality. He might, with the same reason, be puzzled
because one egg looks like another.
Experience, viz., the effect of events upon sen-
tient beings, is caused by sense impressions and con-
sists of sensations. Every sensation is a feeling of a
certain kind and form, and the various sensations are
interrelated. Thus we have (i) the properly feeling
element, or the sentient or sensory part of a sensation,
and (2) its formal or relational aspect.
When we consider /// ahstracto these two qualities,
the purely formal on the one hand and the purely sen-
sory on the other, we are struck by a peculiar contrast.
We attribute necessity and universality to the formal,
while the phenomena of the sensory exhibit such an
irregularity that we can never attain to any certainty
that they are the same in one case as in others.
No amount of sense-experience, be it ever so large,
can justify the proposition, " because something has
been so in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases that it
will be the same in the thousandth case also." While,
contrariwise, one case of experience of a formal con-
sideration, for instance, that the equality of sides in a
triangle constitutes an equality of the angles at its
base is sufficient to establish a universal rule.
This contrast has given many a headache to Mr.
Mill and his followers, but they have never solved the
problem ; nor can they solve it so long as they cling
to the principle from which the sensational school
starts, that all knowledge is and remains a mere asso-
ciation of single sensations; a principle which over-
looks the important contrast between the formal and
the material. Says Mr. Mill in his System of Logic,
III, chap, iii, § 3 :
"There are cases in which we reckon with the most unfailing
confidence upon uniformity, and other cases in which we do not
count upon it at all. In some we feel complete assurance that the
future will resemble the past, the unknown be precisely similar to
the known. In others, however invariable may be the result ob-
tained from the instances which have been observed, we draw
from them no more than a very feeble presumption that the like
result will hold in all other cases. That a straight line is the
shortest distance between two points, we do not doubt to be true
even in the region of the fixed stars.
"Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a com-
plete induction, while in others, myriads of concurring instances,
without a single exception known or presumed, go such a very
little way toward establishing a universal proposition ? Whoever
can answer this question knows more of the philosophy of logic
than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the problem of in-
duction."
He who does not see the contrast between the
formal and the material, between that which imparts
necessity to conclusions and the incidental features of
experience, between the universal and the particular,
can never arrive at scientific certainty, and he will
naturally be puzzled at his own boldness when he un-
hesitatingly accepts some conclusion, based perhaps
upon one single observation, as of universal applica-
tion.
The formal sciences are systematic ; they are pro-
duced by construction and can thus exhaust all possi-
bilities of a case, while our sensory experience bears
the character of the incidental ; all information through
the senses is only in parts. And why is that so?
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We perform certain operations, for instance, in
arithmetic we add and subtract, and we denote the
products of our operations with certain symbols. We
call i + i "two" (denoted by the sign "2") and
i + i + i "three" (denoted by the sign "3"); and we
find that the product of the operation i + i is the same
as the product of the operation 3— i, viz., ^2. This
is so and will be so whenever we repeat the operation;
and this quality that it will always be so is called " ne-
cessity" or "rigidity."
The whole mystery of logical necessity consists in
this, that exactly the same operation will always bring
about exactly the same product. The same is true of
all purely formal operations. Unforeseen interferences
of unknown powers being excluded from this domain
of abstraction, we can pronounce the verdict with ab-
solute certainty that in this sense twice two will under
all circumstances be four.
The objection has been made that twice two may
be five in other worlds, but we reject this view as ab-
surd. We willingly grant that two bacilli plus two
bacilli might be five or even five hundred and more
bacilli, because they might rapidly multiply during the
operation. This is quite possible in the tube of the
microscopist, but it is impossible in mathematics, for
in the realm of abstract thought all such possibilities
are excluded. There we measure or count only our
mental operations. When counting our mental steps
only, we cannot have made five hundred steps when
we have made only four.
Having constructed in our mind systems of formal
thought, such as numbers, geometrical figures, the
logical categories, etc., we are in possession of sched-
ules which serve us for reference when dealing with
the real world, and their infallible rigidity is extremely
useful for extending the sphere of our knowledge.
Having constructed by certain mental operations
(which in their elementary forms are very simple in-
deed, being upon the whole nothing but a combining,
separating, and recombining) we possess in the pro-
ducts of our formal thought an instrument that enables
us to deal with single experiences and to systematise
them into exact, scientific, and philosophical knowl-
edge, in other words, we possess reason.
Reason originates by a differentiation of the formal
and the sensory in experience. As soon as the formal
has been separated in thought from the sensory, as
soon as an animal learns to speak, to count, and to
think in abstracts, it has developed reason. Reason
does not rise out of the sensory element of our sensa-
tions and memory images, but out of their interrela-
tions. Reason is the product of abstract thought-ope-
rations, and pure reason is a system of empty forms
whose office it is to arrange in good order and to sys-
tematise further experience.
Reason is not an arbitrary invention, it is not the
product of a hap-hazard association : reason is the
method of our experience and the norm of all thinking.
Experience is the natural revelation of existence to
sentient beings ; reality impresses itself upon their sen-
tiency and thus forms their notions. Now we find that all
the impressions of experience possess in spite of their
infinite variety certain features in common, and these
universal features develop in the course of the mental
evolution of sentient beings into those notions which
in their systematic unity are called "reason."
Reason is not purely subjective. Reason is objec-
tive in its nature. Our subjective reason, human rea-
son, or the rationality of our mind grows out of that
world-order whiqh we may call the rationality of ex-
istence. Human reason is only the reflection of the
world-reason, the former is rational only in so far as
it agrees with the latter.
Reason (i. e. human reason) in its elementary be-
ginnings consists first of the operations that take place
among mental images. Mental operations are the germ
of reason, and mental operations are as such the same
as any other operations, the same as any process that
takes place in nature. Reason is, secondly, a mental
picture of certain qualities of reality ; and being the
picture of a universal feature of reality, it conveys in-
formation applicable to all reality. Thus reason is,
thirdly, an instrument which enables us methodically
and critically to deal with any kind of experience.
CURRENT TOPICS.
The opening of the World's Fair on Sunday has developed
among the clergy some alarming symptoms of theological hydro-
phobia, and their sermons are made incoherent by hysterical bit-
ing, snapping, and mad-running against the wall. They criticise
the forbearance of the Almighty because he does not show his
vengeance upon Chicago as he did upon the disobedient cities
mentioned in the Bible. Not only did he fail to smite the people
but he assisted in the desecration of the Sabbath by providing for
the Sunday opening an exceedingly fine day. This was very an-
noying to the "divines" who not more than two or three weeks
ago had suggested in their sermons and their prayers that cyclones
and cholera would be better than fine weather for the Sunday
opening. That the Lord should in%'ert the old theology by favor-
ing the Fair instead of the preachers was a grievous disappoint-
ment, and one reverend minister in Boston reminded the Creator
that, "Blessings and curses have fallen upon men or nations, as
they have obeyed or disregarded the laws of God." He was talk-
ing about the opening of the Fair on Sunday, and he was no doubt
surprised that by some omnipotent mistake no "curses" had fol-
lowed that profanation. Then he caressed the directors in a the-
ological way and religiously sprinkled some hot coals upon their
heads, calling them "dishonest men," and "anarchists in their
defiance of the law." Similar delirium prevailed in the pulpits of
Chicago. One doctor of divinity while preaching a "Decoration
Day " sermon compared the Sunday opening of the Fair to the act
of secession, and he declared that any party opposing the Sunday
closing contract was a foe of the nation, whether it was the Co-
lumbian Exposition or any other organisation. Reading over those
brimstone sermons, I offer an apology to my country for the cen-
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sures I have sometimes passed upon its institutions, and its laws.
I ought rather to be grateful for the protection it gives me against
ecclesiastical wrath, that it will not allow me to be burned for
heresy, nor even permit me to be fined and imprisoned for not
going to church on Sundays. The thumbscrew and the rack are
.obsolete, but the spirit that used them is active still, and full of
holy zeal.
* *
One humorous trait of the American character is an affected
reverence for the "law," when it suits our interest or whim, and
a contemptuous disregard for it when it suits neither our pockets
nor our politics. We profess more and practice less obedience to
the law than any other civilised people. I rebuke the large pro-
fession but not the little practice, for a free people always look
with jealousy and suspicion upon the law. They respect it for its
virtues only, and never merely because it is the law. We are al-
ways forcing others to take " law," as if it were some insipid medi-
cine, not at all adapted to ourselves ; and the men who advocate
the closing of the World's Fair on Sundays are picturesque exam-
ples of the custom. Congress made a grant of money to the
World's Fair on condition that it be closed on Sundays, and this
questionable contract the advocates of Sunday closing pretend to
venerate as "law." To disregard it is anarchy, treason, and re-
bellion. The appropriation with its conditions was nothing but a
bargain between Congress and the Fair ; it never was a law. If
Congress should appropriate a sum of money to the Presbyterians
on condition that they keep their churches closed on Sundays, the
condition would not be a law ; and a similar condition made with
any other corporation is not law. And even if the covenant be-
tween Congress and the Fair had all the qualities of a formal sta-
tute, it is in violation of the higher law embodied in the constitu-
tion, " Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." When Congress by statutory enactment recognises
Sunday as a Christian festival, and appropriates money for Sab-
bath observance, it makes a law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, %nd in doing so it violates the constitution. Any act of Con-
gress appropriating money for keeping any place open or closed
on Sundays is religious legislation forbidden by the organic law.
Will not those clerical enthusiasts for " law " bestow some of their
loyal devotion on the law which is higher than any act of Con-
gress, the Constitution of the United States.
* *
Writing on Decoration Day, the old battle scenes crowd upon
the memory until the mental vision becomes dim in the sulphurous
clouds from the great guns ; the lurid panorama glides by me like
the creation of a dream. As the smoke of my old army-pipe curls
in the sunbeams I see again the charges and the counter- charges,
the forms and faces of the men I knew ; and by a weird coinci-
dence I notice that the smoke is blue and gray. These pictures in
the smoke are not altogether the work of reverie ; they are the
ghosts of real battles ; they bring me into spiritual communion
with comrades who are gone ; and by irresistible association they
consecrate the cause for which they died, the preservation of the
American republic and the breaking of human chains. The battle
crucible was hot but it burned the threat of disunion out of our
politics, while it purified the nation of much dross, and redeemed
the land from slavery. Therefore, I reverently accept those re-
sults as a compensation for the sacrifices and the awful experiment
of tvar. If the standard of freedom be not lowered again the war
will be worth its cost.
* »
A quaint mingling of pathos and comedy was the friendly
meeting of Union and Confederate officers on the battle-field of
Gettysburg ; and the account of it is e.xciting by reason of its vivid
personality. The pleasure of the reunion had a touch of sadness
in it, because of those who fell on either side, but this was merged
at last in the delights of mutual admiration. The rough passages
of history were made smooth and every general gave to every other
a certificate that wh^t he did at Gettysburg was precisely what
ought to have been done. " Now tell me General Longstreet, " says
General Howard, "could I have done anything different ? Would
you not have outflanked and overrun me if I had massed my
forces?" .-\nd with chivalrous politeness Longstreet said, "We
would have got around you if you had done otherwise." Then
General Sickles said that he had been blamed for advancing out of
the general line, to which General Longstreet, still affable and in-
dulgent, said, " I had my eye on Little Round Top, and if you had
not advanced so boldly with the Third Corps, I should have gained
it." "Yes," replied Sickles, "and that was the key to the posi-
tion." Of course, as courtesy required, Howard and Sickles gave
Longstreet a certificate absolving him from all the blame laid upon
him for his mistakes, and showing that what he did was the most
military thing that could possibly have been done. .>\nd so they
spent the day in weaving delightful fictions for the amusement of
each other, and showing by the rules of hypothetical strategy the
wisdom of what they did. Conclusive, it all was, like the story of
the old Greenwich pensioner, who used to explain to me when I
was a boy, the battle of the Nile, illustrated by diagrams drawn
with his cane upon the sand, the main part of the instruction being
this, " Now, here was the French and there was we."
* ^
It was unanimously agreed by all the generals at the Gettys-
burg picnic that General Meade committed a blunder in not ad-
vancing upon Lee after the failure of Pickett's charge, but as
Meade was not present at the picnic, being, in fact, many years
dead, he was not within the mutual admiration circle, and there-
fore no harm was done in criticising him. It was conceded by all
that if Grant had been in Meade's place, Lee would never have
got away. General Howard said, " Grant would have followed;
so would Sheridan, and even Thomas, who was reputed slow ";
and somebody asking General Longstreet, " What would Grant
have done ?" he confidently answered, " He would have wiped us
out." It is perilous to prophecy what a certain man will do, be-
cause he may fail to do it ; but there is no danger at all in telling
what he would have done ; and therefore they were all very safe
in saying that Grant would have followed up Lee. It was easy to
say that Meade committed a blunder in letting Lee retreat unmo-
lested, but in doing that he imitated General Grant's own strategy
at Shiloh, which the generals at the picnic had forgotten alto-
gether. Under precisely similar circumstances Meade and Grant
acted precisely alike. Grant failed to follow Beauregard in his
retreat, and Meade failed to follow Lee. In the whole history of
war there is no closer parallel than those two cases make, and yet
the critics of Meade metaphysically pretended to know that Grant
would have followed Lee, although he did not follow Beauregard.
Commanding generals are influenced by the spirit of the men
around them, and there is no evidence that Meade's generals were
any more anxious than he was to follow Lee from Gettysburg.
*
* *
The efforts of the new toryism to cheapen liberty by qualify-
ing it with adjectives and adverbs are signs of patriotic decay.
Liberty is no longer welcome in good society, unless accompanied
by words of limitation and restraint, like those, for instance, used
on Decoration Day by the Presbyterian General Assembly. This
important and influential body paused in the trial of a heretic and
resolved, "that this assembly adjourn at noon to-day to convene
at 7:45 o'clock p. m. as a tribute to the memory of the nation's
patriotic dead who laid down their lives in behalf of our liz'i/ and
loyistilutional liberty." For emphasis, I mark the restraining
words in italics, to make visible the barb-wire fence used by the
Presbyterian General Assembly to limit the range of liberty. Not
even on Decoration Day would the five hundred clergymen who
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composed that assembly condescend to speak of liberty in itS|
broad and universal meaning ; they patronised the definite ab-
straction called "civil and constitutional liberty," but not that!
sublime endowment of every individual man the inalienable right]
of personal freedom, which neither civil statutes nor solemn con-"
stitutions can lawfully take away. Besides, the statement in the
resolution is not historically true, because at the time of the war,
civil and constitutional liberty meant the liberty of the white man
to own the black man and make him work for nothing, while the
" nation's patriotic dead " fought for the liberty of every man to
own himself. Liberty needs no ' ' civil and constitutional " crutchf s
to support it. Liberty, standing in its majesty the guardian of all
other privileges, needs no explanation, while "civil and constitu-
-^ tional " liberty may mean anything within the whole range of
legislation and jurisprudence from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence to the Dred Scott decision. How weak, tame, and doubtful
would have been the immortal speech of Patrick Henry, if he had
said, "G'we me ih'il aud coiisliliilioiui/ liberty, or give me death.'
M. M. Trumbull.
l"at-sight." The term is not used to denote the sensations of sight
lonly, but any kind of sensation. Sensations of sound, of taste, of
Tsmell, of touch, are also called Anschauuiig in the Kantian sense
ifof the term.
Mr. Wake says, "Ideal intuition explains nothing. The basis
of the whole process is sensuous experience." Exactly so. An-
schauuiig, that is, sense-experience, is the basis of all mental ac-
tivity, and also the basis of the origin of language. This is Noire's
theory.
It appears to me that Mr. Saunders's and Mr. Wake's state-
ments of Noire's theory, as being based upon "ideal intuition," is
a striking instance of how ideas, even if correctly translated, are
easily perverted by the different shades of meaning which anal-
ogous words possess in different languages.
NOTES.
Mr. C. Staniland Wake's interesting article on "Thought-
conception " in the last number of T/it: Open Court presents in a
forcible manner the problems of the origin of language and of rea-
son, which, as our contributor correctly remarks, "are identical."
There is, however, one point in which it appears to me that Mr.
Wake, following the authority of Mr, T. Bailey Saunders, has been
misled.
Mr. Wake asks :
' But what led to tlie giving of particular names, or in other words, what
was the principle which guided man in his conceptual work? Noire says
' ideal intuition ' by which the mind perceives the causal nexus between the
object and the sound by which its meaning is expressed."
Mr. Wake adds
;
"This explanation, however, in reality explains nothing. The basis of the
whole process is sensuous experience, and the genesis of the concept lies in
the passage from that experience to the knowledge of the object, which con-
sists in its being named."
Mr. Wake's criticism of Noire is most likely based upon a
statement of Mr. Saunders's in the article "The Origin of Reason,
"
where this author says :
" It is quite true that no theory can afford to dispense with assumptions.
But it is also true that no theory is worth anything which presupposes the ex-
istence of that of which it seeks to show the origin. Noire's two assumptions
are these : the existence of the social instinct, and the presence of what he
calls 'ideal intuition'." {The Open Court, p. 2534.)
Noire is really not guilty of having made these two assump-
tions in the form in which Mr. Saunders states them Noire as-
sumes, if it can be called an assumption, that man was a social
being ; that the ancestors of man were living together in hordes,
and their common life produced the need of communication. There
is no difficulty concerning the first assumption ; " but," says Mr.
Saunders, "there can be little doubt that the second assumption
is quite destructive of the value of the theory as an account by
the origin of reason.. It must be obvious at once that an iJeal in-
tuition is the very process which has to be explained, and that to
assume it as part of the agency vi^hich gives rise to concepts is to
argue in a circle."
I do not know where Mr. Saunders found Noire's expression
" ideal intuition" ; this much is certain, that Noire does not use
the expression in the sense Mr. Saunders attributes to it.
Noire is a follower of Kant, and he uses very often the Kant-
ian terra Anscliauung. The term Anscltauung is usually translated
"by intuition" ; but while the English mind understands by "in-
tuition " some mysterious and prophet-like act of perception, the
German term Anscliauung means the immediate perception of an
object by sensation. Anschauutig is the looking at an object, or,
as we have translated it in The Monist, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 527, an
A few days ago I received a copy of Bishop Phillips Brooks's
sermons, which were accompanied by the following lines :
"Because I differ so radically from The Monist, I have found
" its views exceedingly interesting. Perhaps The Monist may find
" it equally interesting to see how the subject looks as viewed /raw
" tlie other side. With the compliments of A ' Dualist.' "
While expressing my sincerest thanks for the kindly spirit in
which the book was sent, I must call the attention of iny unknown
friend, who calls himself a dualist, to the fact that Phillips Brooks
is much more monistic than could be expected of an Episcopalian
clergyman. He says, for instance, in his first sermon, "The
Candle of the Lord ":
" A man who lives like an inspiration in the city for honesty
"and purity and charity, may be only the candle in whose obed-
" ient life burns still the fire of another strong, true man who was
"his father, and who passed out of men's sight a score of years
" ago. Men call the father dead, but he is no more dead than the
"torch has gone out which lighted the beacon that is blazing on
"the hill."
When our Bishop begins to preach an immanent immortality,
it is a sign of the times that the Religion of Science is near at
hand. P. c.
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